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This paper-a  product of Finance, Development Research Group-is  part of a larger effort in the group to study the impact
of financial structure on economic development. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, [  818 H Street
NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Kari Labrie, room MC3-456,  telephone 202-473-1001,  fax 202-522-1155,
Internet  address  klabrieaworldbank.org.  IPolicy Research Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://
www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at
ademirguckunt@worldbank.org  or rlevineCa@csom.umn.edu.  July 1999. (68 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work  in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They dlo not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterBANK-BASED AND MARKET-BASED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS:
CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS
Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine*
* Development  Research  Group,  The World  Bank,  and Finance  Department,  University  of
Minnesota,  respectively.  The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  of this paper are entirely
those of the authors. They do not necessarily  represent  the views  of the World Bank,  its
Executive  Directors,  or the countries  they represent. We would  like  to thank Thorsten  Beck for
doing  most of the work  and Jerry Caprio  for very helpful  comments.1
I.  INTRODUCTION
Economists have long debated the advantages and disadvantages of bank-based financial
systems vis-a-vis market-based systems.'  This debate has primarily focused on four countries.
In bank-based financial systems such as Germany and Japan, banks play a leading role in
mobilizing savings, allocating capital, overseeing the investment decisions of corporate
managers, and in providing risk management vehicles.  In market-based financial systems such
as England and the United States, securities markets share center stage with banks in terms of
getting society's savings to firms, exerting corporate control, and easing risk management.  Some
analysts suggest that markets are more effective at providing financial services. Others tout the
advantages of intermediaries. The debate is unresolved and hampers the formation of sound
policy advice.
There is a major shortcoming with existing comparisons of market-based versus bank-
based financial systems; they focus on a very narrow set of countries with similar levels of GDP
per capita, so that the countries have very similar long-run growth rates.  Thus, if one accepts that
Germany and Japan are "bank-based" and that England and the United States are "market-based"
and if one recognizes that these countries all have very similar long-run growth rates, then this
implies that financial structure did not matter much. 2 To provide greater information on both the
economic importance and determinants of financial structure, economists need to broaden the
debate to include a wider array of national experiences.
'  See  citations  and discussion  in Allen and Gale  (1997)  and Levine  (1999).
2  While  other  differences  (e.g., fiscal,  monetary,  and  regulatory  policies)  could  have  perfectly  balanced  the growth
effects  of differences  in fnancial structure,  this seems  unlikely. Also,  past studies  of financial  structure  do not
control  for differences  in  non-financial  sector  policies.2
To expand the debate to a broader cross-section of countries, we need new data.  Based
on a newly constructed data set, this paper examines financial structure for a cross-section of up
to 150 countries. We use simple graphs, correlations, and regressions to illustrate the
relationships between financial structure and economic development. Furthermore, we provide
empirical evidence on the potential legal, regulatory, and policy determinants of financial
structure.  This is the first systematic examination of financial structure and economic
development for a large cross-section of countries since Goldsmith's (1969) influential book. It
should be noted, however, that this paper does not examine whether financial structure - whether
the country is bank-based or market-based - exerts a causal influence on economic growth and
firm performance. Levine (1999) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) conduct these
analyses in companion papers.  Rather, this paper presents stylized facts concerning the
relationship between financial structure and economic development and the links between
financial structure and legal, regulatory, and policy determinants for a broad cross-section of
countries.
More specifically, we provide international comparisons regarding three issues.
*  economic development and bank, nonbank, and stock market development,
economic development and bank-based versus market-based systems,
*  the legal, regulatory, tax, and macroeconomic determinants of financial structure.
To analyze financial structure, we must classify countries as either market-based or bank-
based.  We construct a conglomerate index of financial structure based on measures of size,
activity and efficiency. Specifically, we study ratios of banking sector development (measured
in terms of size, activity, and efficiency) relative to stock market development (also measured in3
terms of size, activity, and efficiency). Countries with larger ratios are classified as bank-based.
Countries where the conglomerate ratio of banking sector development to stock market
development is below the mean are classified as market-based. Thus, this grouping system
produces two categories of countries: bank-based and market-based.
While a useful starting point, this bivariate classification system presents a number of
complications. Uncomfortably, this method identifies countries as bank-based even though their
banking systems are poorly developed by international comparisons. This occurs because their
stock markets are very underdeveloped by international standards.  Similarly, this method
identifies countries as market-based even though their markets are underdeveloped by
international comparisons because their banks are extremely underdeveloped.  Consequently, we
develop another grouping system where we first identify countries with highly underdeveloped
financial systems. A country's financial system is considered underdeveloped if it has below
median values of both bank and market development. This produces three categories of financial
structure: underdeveloped, bank-based, and market-based. While this classification system also
has problems, it helps in comparing financial structures across a broad cross-section of countries
because very underdeveloped financial systems have more in common with each other than with
better-developed financial systems that fall into either the bank-based or market-based group.
Although we obtain similar results when only considering bank-based versus market-based
financial systems, we observe much clearer patterns when we consider three categories of
financial structure: underdeveloped, bank-based, and market-based.
We find the following.4
*  Banks, nonbanks, and stock markets are larger, more active, and more efficient in richer
countries.  Financial systems, on average, are more developed in richer countries.
*  In higher income countries, stock markets become more active and efficient relative to
banks.  There is some tendency for national financial systems to become more market
oriented, as they become richer.
*  Countries with a Common Law tradition, strong protection of shareholder rights, good
accounting regulations, low levels of corruption, and no explicit deposit insurance tend to be
more market-based.
*  Countries with a French Civil Law tradition, poor protection of shareholder and creditor
rights, poor contract enforcement, high levels of corruption, poor accounting standards,
restrictive banking regulations, and high inflation tend to have underdeveloped financial
systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents evidence on how
financial systems differ across income per capita groups. Section III defines financial structure
empirically and provides cross-country comparisons. In Section IV, we examine the legal,
regulatory, tax, and policy determinants of financial structure. We summarize the findings in
Section V.
II.  FINANCIAL S  YSTEMS D][FFER  ACROSS INCOME PER CAPITA GROUPS
There are large differences in financial systems across countries. This section uses newly
collected data on a cross-section of up to 150 countries to illustrate how financial systems differ
as one compares poorer with richer countries (measured in terms of GDP per capita).  While not
all measures of financial sector development vary in a systematic way across income groups,5
some notable patterns emerge.  Namely, financial sector development - as measured by the size,
activity, and efficiency of banks, nonbank financial intermediaries,  and equity markets - tends to
be greater in richer countries.  The analysis focuses on data collected in the 1990s.3 We obtain
very similar results when we conduct the analysis over the 1980s, 1970s, or 1960s (data
permitting).  The Appendix shows how financial systems differ over time.  Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Levine (1999) provide detailed information on data sources.
The figures are based on the full sample whereas the tables and correlations only include 63 countries for which
we have complete data.6
A.  Intermediaries
In higher income countries, banks and other financial intermediaries tend to be
larger, more active, and more efficient.
Consider four measures. First, Liquid Liabilities to GDP equals the ratio of liquid
liabilities of bank and non-bank fmancial intermediaries to GDP.  By aggregating the liquid
liabilities of a broad range of banks and nonbanks, Liquid Liabilities to GDP is a general
indicator of the size of financial intermediaries relative to the size of the economy. Liquid
Liabilities to GDP is frequently used as an overall measure of financial sector development
[King and Levine 1993a,b]. Second, Banks Assets / GDP equals the ratio of the total domestic
assets of deposit money banks divided by GDP. Banks Assets / GDP provides a measure of the
overall size of the banling  sector. Third, Claims of Deposit Money Banks on Private Sector /
GDP equals deposit money bank credits to (and other claims on) the private sector as a share of
GDP.  This measure excludes credits to the public sector (central and local governments and
public enterprises). By aggregating bank claims on the private sector, Claims of Deposit Money
Banks on Private Sector / GDP is a general indicator of bank activity in the private sector.
Fourth, Claims of Other Financial Institutions on Private Sector / GDP focuses on insurance
companies, finance coimpanies,  pooled investrment  schemes (mutual funds), savings banks,
private pension funds, and development banks.  Claims of Other Financial Institutions on
Private Sector / GDP equals nonbank credits to (and other claims on) the private sector as a share
of GDP measures the assets side as a share of GDP.  Thus, Claims of Other Financial
Institutions on Private Sector / GDP provides a broad measure of nonbank activity in the private
sector.7
After computing these measures of financial intermediary size and activity, we group
countries into low, lower middle, upper middle and high income countries as defined in 1997
World Development Indicators. 4 Based on this ranking of income, we end up with roughly the
same number of countries in each quartile.  Then, for each quartile we compute the average value
of the financial intermediary development indicators.  Table 1 gives the data for each country.
Figure 1 shows that Liquid Liabilities to GDP, Bank Assets, Claims of Deposit Money Banks ont
the Private Sector / GDP, and Claims of Other Financial Institutions on the Private Sector/GDP
all rise when comparing richer with poorer groups of countries.  These patterns are statistically
significant. The correlations between GDP per capita and Liquid Liabilities to GDP, Bank
Assets, Claims of Deposit Money Banks on the Private Sector / GDP, and Claims of Other
Financial Institutions on the Private Sector/GDP are all significant at the 0.05 level as shown in
Table 2.  In terms of specific countries, Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong,
Japan, Netherlands, and Switzerland have comparatively large, active banking systems (Table 1).
On the other hand, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Turkey, and
Zimbabwe have particularly small, inactive banking systems.  In terms of nonbanks, Japan,
Korea, Netherlands, South Africa, Sweden, and the United States have very large financial
intermediaries (Table 1). Indeed, in the United States, Sweden, and Korea, other financial
intermediaries issue more credit to the private sector than the deposit money banks issue. Also,
note that in richer countries, the direct role of the Central Bank in credit allocation is smaller
(Figure 1 and Table 2).
4  Countries  are classified  according  to their 1995  GNP  per capita.  Low is $765 or less;  lower  middle  is $766-
$3,035;  upper  middle  is $3,036-$9,385;  and high  is $9,386  or more.8
Now, consider two measures of banking sector efficiency.  Overhead cost equals the ratio
of bank overhead costs to the total assets of the banks.  While not unambiguous, we interpret
lower overhead costs as a sign of greater efficiency. Excessive overhead expenditures may
reflect waste and a lack of competition. It should also be recognized, however, that competitive
banks may undertake substantial investments to provide high-quality financial services.  These
productivity-enhancing investments may boost overhead costs.  Very low overhead costs,
therefore, may reflect insufficient competition and insufficient investment in providing superior
banking services. Thus, Overhead cost is not an unambiguously clear measure of efficiency.
A second meastre of bank efficiency, Bank Net Interest Margin, equals the bank interest
income minus interest expense over total assets.  While many factors influence interest margins,
tighter interest margins are frequently viewed as representing greater competition and efficiency.
We obtain Overhead Cosst  and Bank Net Interest Margin from bank-level data across eighty
countries. For each country, we then compute the average across the individual banks.  Figure 1
illustrates that higher inLcome  countries tend to have lower average Overhead cost and lower
average Bank Net Interest Margin.  The correlations (and P-values) between GDP per capita and
Overhead cost and Bank Net Interest Margin further demonstrate  the significant, negative
relationship between GDP per capita and bank efficiency (Table 2).
There is not a statistically significant link between bank concentration and GDP per
capita.  We measure banking sector concentration as share of the assets of the three largest banks
in total banking sector assets and call this measure the Bank Concentration Index.  Figure 1
shows that as we move from lower to higher income countries, bank concentration tends to fall.9
This drop in banking sector concentration, however, is not statistically significant as shown in
Table 2.
In Table 1 we also report Foreign Bank Share and Public Bank Share in total assets.
Both of these measures decrease as we move to high-income countries (Figure 1). These
relationships are also statistically significant as we can see from Table 2.
B. Equity Markets Across Countries
In higher income countries, stock markets tend to be larger, more active, and more
efficient.
To measure market size, we use Market Capitalization as a Share of GDP, which equals
the ratio of the value of domestic equities (that are traded on domestic exchanges) to GDP. To
measure market activity, we use Total Value Traded as a Share of GDP, which equals the value
of the trades of domestic equities on domestic exchanges divided by GDP.  Total Value Traded
as a Share of GDP measures the value of stock transactions relative to the size of the economy.
Total Value Traded as a Share of GDP is frequently used to gauge market liquidity because it
measures trading relative to economic activity [e.g., Levine and Zervos 1998]. Finally, to
measure the efficiency of the market, we use the Turnover Ratio, which equals the value of the
trades of domestic equities on domestic exchanges as a share of the value of domestic equities
(that are traded on domestic exchanges). The Turnover Ratio is not a direct measure of
efficiency. It does not measure trading costs. Rather, the Turnover Ratio measures the value of
stock transactions relative to the size of the market, and it is frequently used as a measure of
market liquidity [Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 1  996a].10
As shown in Figure 2, Market Capitalization as a Share of GDP, Total Value Traded as
a Share of GDP, and Turnover Ratio rise when we move from the poorest quartile of countries
across to the highest quartile of countries. The correlations between GDP per capita and both
Total Value Traded as a Share of GDP and the Turnover Ratio are about 0.4 and significant at
the 0.01 level. The correlation between GDP per capita and Market Capitalization is almost 0.3
and is significant at the 0.05 level.  Stock markets are more developed in richer countries. In
terms of individual cotutries, rankings can depend importantly on the particular measure of stock
market development. There are some countries that show-up as well-developed by all measures
(Australia, Great Britaiin,  Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, and the United States as shown in Table 1).  Some countries are large and
illiquid, such as Chile and South Africa (Table 1). Other countries have active but small stock
markets, especially noteworthy are Korea and Germany.
C.  Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries Across Countries
Insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and other non-bank financial
intermediaries are larger as a share of GDP in richer countries.
Specifically, we measure credits to the private sector issued by insurance companies,
pension funds, pooled investment schemes (mutual funds), development banks, and other non-
bank financial institutions. These measures are computed as a share of GDP. Figure 3A shows
that each of these measures of non-bank financial intermediary size is larger in richer countries.
But, as countries get richer the role of insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds
rises relative to the role of development banks and other non-banks (Figure 3B).11
For the life insurance sector we include an additional size and two additional activity
measures (Figure 3C). The size of the life insurance sector, defined as the private credit by life
insurance companies as a percentage of GDP, increases with income.  The activity measures, life
insurance penetration, measured by premiums to GDP, and life insurance density, measured by
premiums to population also follow a similar pattern.  The high-income countries exhibit a life
insurance penetration ten times as high as lower-middle income countries and a life insurance
density nearly one hundred times higher than low-income countries.
D. Overall Efficiency
In higher income countries, the overall financial system becomes larger, more active,
and more efficient.
Until now, we have focused on either intermediaries or stock markets. Here, we analyze
measures of the overall financial system.  We consider five measures of overall financial sector
development. First, we measure the overall size of the financial system.  To do this, we sum the
domestic assets of deposit money banks with stock market capitalization and divide by GDP.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) use a similar indicator to measure the overall level of financial sector
development. As shown in Figure 4, the overall size of the financial sector rises sharply with
GDP per capita, and the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (Table 4).
Next, we consider four measures of overall financial sector development, where we "mix-
and-match" different measures of stock market and banking development. We use both
Turnover and Total Value Traded! GDP to measure stock market liquidity, such that we
interpret higher levels as indicating more efficiently operating equity markets.  For gauging12
stock market development on an economy-wide basis, we prefer the Total Value Traded/ GDP_
measure to the Turnover ratio.  Total Value Traded! GDP measures trading relative to the size of
the economy, where as Turnover measures trading relative to the size of the market. Thus, a
small active market may have high Turnover and low Total Value Traded! GDP. Since we are
seeking to measure the ease of trading ownership of a country's firms, Total Value Traded/ GDP
measures this more directly. Nonetheless, we provide the results using both.  Similarly, we use-
both Overhead Cost and Bank Net Interest Margin to measure banking sector inefficiency. Here,
we interpret higher levels as indicating less efficiently operating banks.  Thus, we construct four
measures of overall fmancial sector development by dividing each of the stock market indictors
by each of the banking sector inefficiency measures.
The results using measures of the overall efficiency of the financial sector are plotted in
Figure 4, where the countries are broken-up into income quartiles.  As shown, richer countries
tend to have more efficient financial systems and the positive relationship is economically
significant at the 0.05 significance level for all of the measures (Table 4).  Some countries stand
out in terms of overall financial sector efficiency. In particular, Malaysia, Hong Kong,
Singapore, the Netherlands, Japan, Thailand, Korea, Great Britain, the United States,
Switzerland, and Australia are ranlked  very highly by our two preferred measures of overall
financial sector efficiency (those based on the stock market indicator, Total Value Traded ! GDP,
and the two bank efficiency measures Overhead Cost and Bank Net Interest Margin).13
III. FINANCIAL STRUCTURE: COMPARISONS AND DEFINITIONS
We now turn to financial structure. Above we showed that intermediaries and stock
markets tend to be larger, more active, and more efficient in countries with higher levels of GDP
per capita. This section focuses on banks relative to stock markets.  First, we examine patterns
across countries in the size, activity, and efficiency of banks relative to stock markets.  Second,
we attempt to classify countries as having market- or bank-based financial systems using data
available for a broad cross-section of countries. This section emphasizes the difficulties in using
any single measure of financial structure. Then we construct a conglomerate index of financial
structure and make the classification based on this index. Furthermore, we also distinguish
among economies with underdeveloped and developed financial systems.  This provides
additional information about financial structure, i.e., if a particular bank-based (market-based)
system has banks (markets) that can be considered developed by international standards. For
example, both Germany and Pakistan are classified as bank-based systems, but in Pakistan banks
cannot perform the functions expected of a bank-based system because they are not as well
developed as German banks.  Similarly, the United States and the Philippines are both market-
based systems, but the markets in the Philippines are not as effective at providing financial
services. Indeed, when we look at determinants of financial structure we see countries like
Pakistan and the Philippines have more in common with each other than their respective bank-
based and market-based counterparts.14
A. Size
In higher income countries, banks do not become larger or smaller relative to the
size of domestic stock markets.  Consider measures of financial structure based on size.
Specifically, Bank vs Capitalization equals the domestic assets of deposit money banks relative
to domestic stock market capitalization (i.e., Bank vs Capitalization equals Bank Assets divided
by Market Capitalization).  As in earlier figures, Figure 5 graphs Bank vs. Capitalization by
income quartile. The first bar in the figure lists the average level of Bank vs Capitalization for
the low-income countries. As shown, there is not a strong relationship between income level and
the size of domestic bank assets relative to the size of the domestic stock market.
Now consider how Bank vs Capitalization classifies particular countries as having bank-
based versus market-based financial structures. This relative size measure is given in Table 5,
which ranks countries from lowest to highest based on Bank vs Capitalization. There is a large
range, from 0.40 (Souith  Africa) to 10.24 (Austria).  Consider the ten countries that have the
largest markets relative to the size of the banks.  These include the United States, Sweden, Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, which many observers classify as market-based. However, the
Bank vs Capitalization measure classifies Jamaica, Mexico, and the Philippines as market-based.
It does this primarily because banks are very small and under-developed in these countries, not
because their stock mazrkets  are particularly well developed.  Indeed, Mexico's stock market
capitalization ratio is below the sample mean.  Similarly, the Bank vs Capitalization measure
identifies Chile and South Africa as market-based even though not much trading is done on their
stock markets as notedl  below.15
At the other end of the bank- versus market-based range, we find the same issues.
Consider the ten countries that have the largest banks relative to the size of domestic stock
markets. The relative size measure of financial structure identifies Austria, Panama, Portugal,
Tunisia, and Germany as bank-based. However, the Bank vs Capitalization measure also
classifies Bangladesh, Egypt, and Iran as bank-based. Again, these are classified as bank-based
primarily because their stock markets are very small and under-developed, not because their
banks are particularly well developed.  Specifically, Bangladesh, Egypt, and Iran have banks that
are smaller as a share of GDP than the sample mean.  Thus, while the relative size measure
provides useful information about the relative size of banks versus stock markets, it has obvious
limitations. Notably, if a country has a large value of the Bank vs Capitalization measure, this
does not necessarily indicate that it has a well-developed banking system relative to the banking
systems of other countries.  Similarly, if a country has a very low value of the Bank vs
Capitalization measure, this does not necessarily indicate that it has a well-developed equity
market relative to the equity markets of other countries.
We also examined banks relative to nonbank financial intermediaries. Specifically, we
constructed a measure of the size of banks relative to the size of nonbanks called Bank vs Other
Financial Institutions, which equals the domestic assets of deposit money banks divided by
domestic assets of other financial intermediaries. We can see from Figure 5 and Table 6 that
there is not a strong tendency for banks to grow or shrink relative to nonbanks when moving
across income quartiles.
B. Activity16
In higher income countries, domestic stock markets tend to become more active
relative to domestic banks. To measure financial structure based on activity, consider the ratio
of private credit by deposit money banks relative to the total value of stock transactions on
domestic exchanges, and call this ratio Bank Credit vs Trading.  The Bank Credit vs Trading
measure of financial structure will be larger in countries where banks are actively engaged in
funneling credit to the private sector relative to the value of trading on domestic stock markets.
Figure 6 shows that richer groups of countries tend to have lower values of the ratio Bank Credit
vs Trading measure of f.inancial  structure; countries tend to become more market-based as they
grow richer.  Similarly, stock markets also tend to become more active relative to nonbank
financial intermediaries as indicated in the same figure.
Now, lets consider individual country rankings using the relative activity measure of
banks versus markets.  The relative activity measure of financial structure (Bank Credit vs
Trading) yields a somewhat different classification of countries than the relative size measure
(Bank vs Capitalization). Table 7 ranks countries from lowest to highest based on the Bank
Credit vs Trading measure of financial structure. Values range from 0.7 to 196, though the
extremely high values correspond to, countries where there is virtually no trading on their stock
exchanges.  Consider the ten countries that have the least active banks relative their markets.
These include the United States, Sweden, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, which were also
classified as market-based by the size measure of financial structure (Bank vs Capitalization).
The relative activity measure also classifies Korea as market-based. Korea has an active, though
not very large, stock market and over the last fifteen years nonbanks have played an increasingly
large role, so that deposit money bank credit to the private sector is not a very large share of17
GDP.  The relative activity measure, Bank Credit vs Trading, also classifies Turkey, Mexico, and
Brazil as market-based. This occurs because banks are very inactive and under-developed in
these countries, not because they have active stock markets. Indeed, Trading in these countries is
less than the sample average.  Also, note that Chile and South Africa no longer enter as market-
based.  These two countries have large, but relatively inactive stock exchanges.
The Bank Credit vs Trading measure of financial structure faces even greater problems in
identifying bank-based financial systems because a large number of countries have very inactive
stock markets, which boosts the Bank Credit vs Trading measure as shown in Table 7.5  To
mitigate this problem, consider only countries where bank credit to the private sector relative to
GDP is greater than the sample mean.  Then, the relative activity measure of financial structure
identifies Panama, Tunisia, Cyprus, Austria, Portugal, Cyprus, Belgium, Italy, and Finland as
bank-based, which is consistent with our expectations. Thus, while the relative activity measure
provides useful information about the relative activity of banks versus stock markets, it also has
specific limitations.  As with the relative size measure, if a country has a large value of the Bank
Credit vs Trading measure, this does not necessarily indicate that it has a very active banking
system relative to the banking systems of other countries.
We also compared stock markets with nonbank financial intermediaries. Specifically, we
constructed a measure of the activity of stock markets relative to nonbank financial
intermediaries. The activity of nonbanks relative to the activity of the stock market is called
Other Financial Institutions vs Trading, which equals private credit of nonbanks divided by the
5 Specifically, Cyprus, Egypt, Honduras, Zimbabwe, Panama, Barbados, Costa Rica, Nepal, Iceland, Tunisia,
Bangladesh, Kenya, Mauritius, Iran, and Trinidad and Tobago, Ecuador, and Colombia have high values of Bank
Credit vs Trading because the value of domestic stock transactions sums to less than two percent of GDP.18
value of stock transactions.  We see from Figure 6 and Table 8 that nonbanks tend to shrink
relative to stock market activity when moving to higher income quartiles.
C. Efficiency
In higher income countries, domestic stock markets tend to become more efficient
relative to domestic banks. To measure financial structure based on efficiency, we focus on
two measures of market- versus bank-based financial structures. For markets, we concentrate on
the value of stock mariket  transaction relative to the size of the economy (Total Value as Share of
GDP). We do not use the Turnover ratio to avoid classifying countries with active, but small,
markets as market-based. To classify a country as market-based, we want them to have a large
and an active stock market relative to their banking system. For banks, we use two measures:
Overhead Cost and Bank Net Interest Margin.  Thus, we focus on two measures of financial
structure base on efficiency: (1) Trading vs Overhead Cost, which equals Total Value Traded /
GDP multiplied by Overhead Cost; and (2) Trading vs Interest Margin, which equals Total
Value Traded  / GDP multiplied by Bank Net Interest Margin.
Figure 7 shows that richer countries tend to have higher levels Trading vs Overhead Cost
and Trading vs Interest Margin.  According to these relative efficiency measures of financial
structure, countries tend to become more market-based as they grow richer.
Turning to specific countries, the Trading vs Interest Margin and the Trading vs
Overhead Cost measures of financial structure identify nine countries that (i) have very high
values, which signifies market-based econoniies and (ii) have Total Value Traded / GDP values
greater than the sample mean (Tables 9 and 10). Thus, Malaysia, Hong Kong, the United States,19
Singapore, Great Britain, Switzerland, Sweden, Thailand, and Korea have active stock markets
relative to their banks and relative to world markets. While the Trading vs Interest Margin and
the Trading vs Overhead Cost measures of financial structure also classify Brazil and Turkey
market-based, these markets are not very active. Specifically, Total Value Traded ! GDP in
Brazil and Turkey are below the sample mean.
In terms of classifying countries as bank-based, we again run into the problem that many
countries have very inactive markets. Thus, the Trading vs Interest Margin and the Trading vs
Overhead Cost measures of financial structure classify these countries as bank-based even when
their banking system are not very well-developed. Thus, to identify bank-based countries we
again use two-step criteria. If (i) both Trading vs Interest Margin and the Trading vs Overhead
Cost measures of financial structure have very low values, which signifies bank-based economies
and (ii) the country has a Private Credit of Deposit Money Banks / GDP value of grater than the
sample mean, we consider the country bank-based. These criteria identify Panama, Tunisia,
Cyprus, Portugal, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Jordan, Norway, and Japan as bank-based financial
systems.20
D. Conglomerate Indexes of Financial Structure
In higher income countries, financial systems tend to be more market-based. This
subsection constructs a conglomerate index of financial structure based on measures of size,
activity, and efficiency. Since (1) measures of relative size, activity, and efficiency place
countries into slightly different places along market-based versus bank-based spectrum and (2)
there is little reason to favor one particular measure of financial structure over another, this
subsection merges three different measures to produce a conglomerate index of financial
structure.  Specifically, after removing the means of each series, we take the average of
Capitalization vs Bank, Trading vs Bank Credit, and Trading vs Overhead Cost and call the
result, Structure. Higher values of Structure signify a higher degree of stock market
development relative to the development of the banking system.  We also conducted the analysis
using the means-removed average of Capitalization vs Bank, Trading vs Bank Credit, and
Turnover vs Overhead Cost and obtained virtually identical rankings and results.
Figure 8 shows that richer countries tend to have higher levels of stock market
development relative ito  the development of their banking systems.  The correlation between
Structure and real per capita GDP is .29 and is significant at the 0.05 level.
Even with this conglomerate index, however, we observe some problems with classifying
countries as market-based or bank-based (Table 11).  For example, Structure classifies Turkey
as market-based since the value of Structure for Turkey is in the top ten countries. Yet, Turkey
has below average measure of stock market development, as measured by the Total Valued
Traded I GDP ratio. As we saw above, some countries are classified as market-based because
they have poorly developed banks.  The same is true at the other end of the spectrum. Structure21
classifies Bangladesh, Nepal, Costa Rica and Honduras as bank-based because the value of
Structure for these countries is in the bottom 10 of the sample. Yet, each of these countries has
below average values of most of the banking sector development indicators.  There may be
potential advantages to considering a country as bank-based only if it has well-developed banks
relative to other countries and if its banks are well-developed relative to its markets.
E.  Financial Structure in Developed vs. Underdeveloped Financial Systems
Measures of financial structure produce intuitively plausible classifications of
countries as either bank-based or market-based for both financially developed and
underdeveloped economies.
This subsection creates four categories of countries based on the structure and level of
development of their financial systems.  The four categories are (1) underdeveloped and bank-
based, (2) underdeveloped and market-based, (3) developed and bank-based, and (4) developed
and market-based. We do not use a simple bank-based, market-based classification since we
want to avoid classifying two countries in the same bank-based category if one has poorly
developed banks by international standards.  Similarly, we want to avoid classifying countries in
a single market-based category when some have poorly developed markets by international
standards.  Therefore, we distinguish countries that have underdeveloped financial systems from
those that have developed systems. We define a country as having an underdeveloped financial
system if both of the following hold: (1) Claims of Deposit Money Banks on the Private Sector /
GDP is less than the sample mean and (2) Total Value Traded as a Share of GDP is less than the
sample mean, as reported at the foot of Table 1. Thus, we only classify a country's financial
system as underdeveloped if it has poorly developed banks and markets.22
Market-based vs. bank-based split is determined by the Structure index. Using the
Structure measure of iEnancial  structure, Table 11 ranks countries along the spectrum from bank-
based to market-based, where higher values of Structure indicate higher levels of stock market
development relative ito  banking sector development. Countries that have above the mean values
of Structure are then c lassified as market-based. Countries that have below the mean values of
Structure are classified as bank-based.
Table 12 lists the four categories of countries. As shown, this simple classification
system produces intuitively appealing results.  For instance, developed economies such as
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and Spain are classified as bank-
based. Three developing countries are also classified as financially developed and bank-based:
Panama, Tunisia, and Jordan. This classification system also identifies economies with large,
active stock markets. For example, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, United
States, and Switzerland are each identified as having market-based financial systems.
Interestingly, Korea, which many authors consider to be dominated by large banks [e.g., Park
1993], is also identified as having a market-based financial system.  Korea is classified as
market-based because it has a very active, efficient equity market, as reflected in high Turnover
and Total Valued Traded/ GDP ratios (Table 1). Also, nonbanks play a substantial role.  Indeed,
nonbanks issue more credit to the private sector than banks in Korea.  Thus, while intermediaries
play a relatively large role in Korea, nonbanks share center stage with banks (Table 1).
Looking at financially underdeveloped economies, we see that they are disproportionately
bank-based as expected, since financial structures become more market-based as countries
develop. The classification of countries like Chile, Mexico, Turkey and the Philippines as23
market-based  reflects  the significant  development  of their stock  markets  since  the second  half of
1  980s. Other  countries  like Bangladesh,  Nepal, Kenya  and Costa  Rica  remain  bank-based  since
their stock  markets  are  not yet developed. Yet other countries  like  India,  Indonesia  and Pakistan
have  seen some  development  of their stock  markets,  but are classified  as bank-based  because
their  banks still  play a more  important  role in their financial  systems.
6  As a robustness  check,  we combined  Private  Credit  by Deposit  Money  Banks  with  Private  Credit  by
Other  Financial  Intermediaries  to create  an overall  measure  of financial  intermediary  development.  We want to
evaluate  whether  the inclusion  of nonbanks  materially  influences  the classification  of countries.  After re-doing  the
above  analysis  with  this financial  intermediary  variable,  we find  few changes.  Panama,  Portugal,  Belgium  and Italy
were classified  as bank-based  but underdeveloped  systems. Canada,  Sweden,  Thailand  and  South  Africa  were
classified  as intermediary-based  rather  than market-based  systems. Finally,  Ireland  was classified  as intermediary-
based  but developed  rather  than underdeveloped.24
IV.  THE LEGAL, REGULATORY, TAX AND MACROECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF
FINANCIAL STRUiCTURE
A rich literature examines how features of the legal, regulatory, tax, and macroeconomic
environment influence financial contracting and the functioning of intermediaries and markets.
This paper collects cross-country information on many of the legal, regulatory, tax and
macroeconomic determinants of financial development proposed by the literature. We then
examine whether coumtries  with different financial structures have different legal, regulatory, tax,
and macroeconomic characteristics. We find the most significant differences in means exist
between underdeveloped (regardless of bank-based or market-based), developed bank-based, and
developed market-based financial systems. For brevity, we name these categories
underdeveloped, bank-based and market-based, respectively.  We also examine the correlations
between these potential determinants and the three categories and the financial structure index.
Finally, we use simple regressions that control for the level of real per capita GDP to assess the
relationship betweern  the legal, regulatory, tax, and macroeconomic variables and measures of
financial structure. Caution, however, should be exercised in interpreting the results.  We use the
word "determinant" because theory and past work suggests that these variables exert a causal
influence on the functioning of the financial system.  We do not, however, provide any statistical
evidence on causation. We simply present summary statistics.
A. The Leg  al Environment
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, henceforth LLSV) explain how
countries with different legal origins develop distinct laws governing debt and equity contracts.
Specifically, legal scholars have identified four major legal "families:" English Comnmon  Law,25
French Civil Law, German Civil Law, and Scandinavian Civil Law.  Legal systems spread
primarily through conquest and colonization. These legal families treat equity and debt
contracting differently. The consequent differences in the contracting environment have had
profound implications on the evolution of intermediaries and securities markets as demonstrated
by LLSV (1997, 1998), Levine (1998, 1999a,b), Levine, Loayza, Beck (1999), and Maksimovic
and Demirguc-Kunt (1998).  Here, we use LLSV measures of the legal environment.
1.  legal origin
Common Law countries are more likely to have market-based financial systems
than countries with other legal origins.  Underdeveloped financial systems are more likely
to have French Civil Law legal systems than other legal origins.
In terms of legal origin, LLSV focus on the difference between countries that have
Common Law origins and countries with a French Civil Law tradition.  LLSV show that
Conmmon  Law countries tend to stress the rights of minority shareholders with beneficial
implications for securities market development [LLSV 1997]. In contrast, countries with a
French legal tradition do not emphasize the rights of minority shareholders with adverse effects
on the functioning of equity markets [Levine 1999b]. In terms of debt contracts, legal systems
that stress creditor rights tend to generate beneficial repercussions for financial intermediary
development [Levine 1998, 1999; Levine, Loayza, Beck 1999].  The few countries with German
Legal foundations tend to stress the rights of creditors to a much greater degree than other
countries [LLSV 1998].  LLSV (1998) also shows that countries with a French Legal tradition
tend to have comparatively inefficient contract enforcement and higher levels of corruption with
negative repercussions for financial sector performance.26
We first examine the relationship between legal origin and the structure of the financial
system.  To do this, we create the dummy variable English that takes on the value of one if the
country has a Common Law legal tradition.  We also create the dummy variable French, which
equals one if the country has French Civil Law origins. We do not focus on German Civil Law
and Scandinavian Civil Law countries because there are relatively few and because the main
distinctions are between the Common Law and French Civil Law countries [LLSV 1998]. Table
13 divides countries into those with underdeveloped, bank-based, and market-based financial
systems.  It then presents the average values of the legal, regulatory, tax, and macroeconomic
determinants and tests whether there are significant differences in the means of these
determinants across the different financial structures.  7  Table 14 presents simple correlations.
Underdeveloped, Bank, Market in Table 14 are simple dummy variables taking the value 1 if a
country is classified as an underdeveloped, bank-based, or market-based economy, respectively.
Structure is the structure index reported in Table 11. Finally, Table 14 also presents evidence on
the partial correlation between the financial structure variables and the determinants after
controlling for the level of GDP per capita.
Countries with market-based financial systems are much more likely to have Common
Law origins than underdeveloped or bank-based systems.  Similarly, Common Law countries
tend to have market-based financial systems even after controlling for the level of GDP per
capita. Underdeveloped and bank-based financial systems are more likely to have French legal
7 The 4-way  split in Table 12 or a 2-way  bank-based  vs. market-based  split  without  taking  into account  financial
development  do not produce  significant  results. Differences  in  means  become  significant  only if we analyze
underdeveloped  countries  as a single  group. Thus  we look  at differences  among  underdeveloped  and (developed)
bank-based  and (developed)  market-based  financial  structures.  However,  this classification  is less  important  when
we look  at correlations,  since  correlations  with  the continuous  structure  index  also produce  consistent  results.27
origins than market-based systems and there is a positive correlation between French Civil Law
countries and underdeveloped financial systems.
2. legal codes
Countries with legal codes that rigorously protect the rights of minority
shareholders tend to have market-based fmancial systems. Countries with legal codes that
stress the rights of creditors and shareholders are much less likely to have underdeveloped
financial systems.
We now examine the relationship between particular legal codes and financial structure.
Here we use two variables.  SRIGHTS is LLSV's (1998) index of the degree to which the legal
codes of the country protect monetary shareholder rights. 8 LLSV (1998) note that to the extent
that a country's laws help potential shareholders feel confident about their property and voting
rights, this should be reflected in larger, more active, and hence more efficient equity markets.
LLSV (1997) and Levine (1999b) confirmn  this hypothesis.  The second variable, CRIGHTS is an
index of the degree to which the legal codes of the country protect purchasers of debt contracts,
which is also based on the LLSV (1998) database. 9 If the legal environment makes banks
confident about their claims, this should encourage the development of an active banking sector.
8 Shareholder  rights, SRIGHTS,  is an index  which is formed  by adding I when:  (1) the country  allows  shareholders
to mail  their proxy  vote to the firm;  (2) shareholders  are not required  to deposit  their shares  prior to the General
Shareholders'  Meeting;  (3) cumulative  voting  or proportional  representation  of minorities  in the board  of directors
is allowed;  (4) an oppressed  minorities  mechanism  is in place;  (5) the minimum  percentage  of share  capital  that
entitles  a shareholder  to call for an Extraordinary  Shareholders'  Meeting  is less  than or equal  to 10 percent  (the
sample  mean);  or (6) shareholders  have  preemptive  rights  that can only  be waved  by a shareholders'  vote.  The index
ranges  from 0 to 6.
9 CRIGHTS  is an index  aggregating  different  creditor  rights. The index is formed  by adding I when:  (1) the
country  imposes  restrictions,  such as creditors'  consent  or minimum  dividends  to file for  reorganization;  (2) secured
creditors  are able to gain  possession  of their security  once  the reorganization  petition  has  been approved  (no
automatic  stay);  (3) secured  creditors  are ranked  first in  the distribution  of the proceeds  that  result from the28
Market-based economies tend to have much stronger shareholder rights than either bank-
based or underdeveloped financial systems (Table 13).  Table 14 also shows that there is a
significant positive correlation between market-based systems and the strength of shareholder
rights protection even after controlling for the level of GDP per capita. In terms of creditor
rights, however, there is little difference between bank-based and market-based financial
systems. Note, however, that countries with legal systems that stress the rights of creditors tend
not to have underdeveloped financial system after controlling for differences in GDP per capita.
3. enforcement
Poor contract enforcement goes hand-in-hand with underdeveloped financial
systems, contract enforcement is not strongly linked with whether a country's financial
system is bank-based or market-based.
Laws are important, but the enforcement of those laws is frequently more important for
financial development [LLSV 1998]. We use an index of contract enforcement that measures
whether the country's laws are efficiently and impartially enforced and whether governments
tend to change the nature of contracts ex post." 0 Higher values of ENFORCE indicate greater
efficiency in enforcing contracts.  Improved contract enforcement lowers transactions costs and
should facilitate equity and debt contracting [LLSV (1997, 1998) and Levine (1999a,b)].  There
are not good a priori reasons to believe that efficient contract enforcement will favor debt or
equity contracting relative to the other.
disposition  of the assets  of a bankrupt  firm;  and (4)  the debtor does  not retain  the administration  of its property
pending  the resolution  of the reorganization.  The index  ranges  from 0 to 4.
'° This  enforcement  variable,  ENFORCE,  averages  the contract  risk and law  and order variables  collected  by LLSV
(1998)  as discussed  in  Levine  (1998).29
Countries with underdeveloped financial system are much likely to have low levels of
contract enforcement. (Table 13). There is little difference between bank-based and market-
based financial systems in terms of contract enforcement. The strong negative connection
between the efficiency of contract enforcement and the degree of overall financial sector
development holds even after controlling for differences in income per capita (Table 14).
4. corruption
There is a strong positive link between corruption and financial underdevelopment.
Countries with lower levels of corruption tend to have more market-based financial
systems.
Corruption, if it exists, can severely undermine enforcement of legal codes.  We use an
index of corruption, CORRUPT, which measures corruption in government (LLSV, 1997).
Lower scores indicate that government officials are likely to demand special payments in the
form of bribes throughout all levels of government.
Countries with underdeveloped financial systems are much more likely to have high
levels of corruption in government (Table 13).  To the extent that corruption reflects poor
enforcement of legal codes, countries with poorly operating legal systems tend to have less well-
developed financial systems.
Corruption tends to hurt development of markets disproportionately since well-enforced
shareholder rights are essential for market-based financial systems. Indeed, lower levels of
corruption are correlated with more market-based financial structures (Table 14).30
B. Regulatory Environment
Government regulations and guidelines materially affect the functioning of the financial
sector. Through listing requirements, regulations, policies, and tax laws, governments influence
accounting practices, permissible practices of banks, and deposit insurance.  Each of these
strategies may affect the operation of banks and markets.  The section empirically examines
accounting standards and bank regulations.
1.  accounting
Countries with strong accounting standards tend to have market-based financial
systems and are unlikely to have underdeveloped financial systems.
Information about corporations is critical for exerting corporate governance and making
investment decisions.  Accounting standards that simplify the interpretability and comparability
of information across corporations will facilitate financial contracting.  Furthermore, financial
contracting that use accounting measures to trigger particular actions can more usefully be used
with effective accounting standards.  Governments impose an assortment of regulations
regarding information disclosure and accounting standards.  This paper examines a measure of
the quality of information disclosed through corporate accounts from LLSV (1998).
ACCOUNT is an index of the comprehensiveness of company reports.  The
maximum possible value is 90 and the minimum is 0.  The Center for International Financial
Analysis and Research assessed general accounting information, income statements, balance
sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, and stock data in company reports in 1990.
Underdeveloped financial systems are much less likely to have high accouriting
standards. (Table 13). Furthermore, the positive relationship between financial development and31
accounting  standards  holds even  after controlling  for the level  of real per capita  GDP. Finally,
comprehensive,  high-quality  information  about firns is very strongly  correlated  with market-
based  systems. Thus,  the easy availability  of good,  comparable  corporate  financial  statements  is
particularly  important  for the operation  of equity  markets.
2.  bank regulations
Countries with regulations that restrict the rights of banks to engage in
securities market activities, real estate, and insurance are more likely to have
underdeveloped fmancial systems.
T-his  section uses data on allowable nontraditional activities of banks from Barth, Caprio,
and Levine (1998). We consider the degree to which a country's regulatory system allows banks
to engage in the following four nontraditional activities:
- Securities: the ability of banks to engage in the businesses of securities underwriting,
brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund business.
- Insurance: the ability of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and selling.
*  Real Estate: the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, development and
management.
*  Nonfinancial Firm Ownership: the ability of banks to own and control nonfinancial
firms.
After assessing each country's regulations, a number between one and four was assigned
to each activity - Securities, Insurance, Real Estate, and Nonfinancial Firm Ownership. The
assigned numbers are interpreted as follows: one -- indicates "unrestricted": banks can engage in
the full range of the activity directly in the bank; two  -- indicates "permitted": the full range of
those activities can be conducted, but all or some of the activity must be conducted in32
subsidiaries; three  -- indicates "restricted": banks can engage in less than full range of to
activity, either in the bank or subsidiaries; four -- indicates "prohibited": the activity may not be
conducted by the bank or subsidiaries.
RESTRICT is a summary index of overall regulatory restrictiveness. RESTRICT equals
the average value of Securities, Insurance, Real Estate, and Nonfinancial Firm Ownership, so that
RESTRICT takes on values between 1 (least restrictive) and 4 (most restrictive). The average
value of RESTRICT is 2.2, with a standard deviation of 0.6. The United States has a value of 3.
As shown in Table 13, countries with underdeveloped financial systems tend to have
much greater restrictions on the activities of their banks.  The negative relationship between
regulatory restrictiveness and financial sector development holds after controlling for the level of
GDP per capita at the 0.05 significance level (Table 14). Thus, while Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(1998) show that greater restrictiveness tends to increase the fragility of the banking system, this
paper shows that greaLter  restrictiveness is also associated with a generally underdeveloped
financial system.
3.  deposit insurance
Countries with explicit deposit insurance systems are less likely to have market-
based financial systems.
Explicit deposit insurance systems may increase confidence that the general public has in
the formal banking system.  This may allow easier entry of new banks and operation of smaller
banks that have reputation disadvantages.
To assess if there is any link between deposit insurance and financial structure we use
deposit insurance, a dummy variable that takes on the value one for countries with explicit33
deposit  insurance  and zero  for those  that do not. As shown  in Table 13,  countries  with explicit
deposit  insurance  are most likely  to have  bank-based  financial  systems  and least likely  to have
market-based  systems. Although  the correlation  between  bank-based  financial  systems  and
explicit  deposit  insurance  is not significant,  the negative  correlation  between  market-based
systems  and deposit  insurance  holds when  we control  for differences  in income  per capita.
C.  Taxes
There is not a strong link between financial structure and tax distortions favoring
either dividends or capital gains relative to interest income.
We consider two tax variables.  Dividend Disadvantage equals the degree to which the
tax laws discriminate  against  dividend  income  relative  to interest  income." Higher  values
signify  greater  tax disadvantage  for dividend  income. Capital  Gains  Disadvantage  equals  the
degree  to which  the tax system  discriminates  against  capital  gains  income  relative  to interest
income.' 2 As shown  in Table 13, we could  not find a strong  link between  the tax distortions  and
financial  structure.
Assuming  that  marginal  investor  is a private  individual  who is sufficiently  wealthy  to be paying  personal  income
taxes  at the highest  rate, dividend  disadvantage  equals  the extent  to which  net income  per $1 of dividends  is less
than  net income  from $1 of interest  income.
12 Assuming  that  marginal  investor  is a private  individual  who is sufficiently  wealthy  to be paying  personal  income
taxes  at the highest  rate, capital  gains  disadvantage  equals  the extent  to which  net income  per $1 of capital  gains is
less  than  net income  from $1 of interest  income.34
D.  Macroeconomy
High-inflation economies are much more likely to have underdeveloped financial
systems, but inflatioin  is not strongly linked with whether a country's financial system is
bank-based or market-based.
Macroeconomic instability may importantly distort and complicate financial contracting.
Huybens and Smith (: 999) show theoretically and Boyd, Levine, and Smith (1999) confirm
econometrically that higher levels of inflation produce smaller, less active, and less efficient
banks and markets.' 3 This subsection examines the relationship between financial structure and
inflation. As shown in Table 13, economies with underdeveloped financial systems tend to have
higher inflation rates than either bank-based or market-based systems. Inflation, however, is not
significantly different in bank- versus market-based systems. The correlation table confirns  this.
Inflation is positively correlated with financial underdevelopment even after controlling for the
level of GDP per capita, but no significant inflation rate differences exist between bank-based
and market-based systems.' 4
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper vve  used newly collected data on a cross-section of up to 150 countries to
illustrate how financial systems differ around the world.  In providing the first systematic
13  Boyd,  Levine,  and Smith  (1999)  highlight  the nonlinear  relationship  between  inflation  and financial  sector
performance.
14 We also investigated  the linkages  between  financial  structure  and growth  in GDP  per capita,  existence  of black
market  premium,  and  equality  of income  distribution.  There  is no correlation  between  black  market  premium  and
financial  structure. While  there is some indication  that  countries  with  more  equal  income  distribution  and  higher
growth  are more  likely  to have  market-based  fnancial structures,  the statistical  significance  of these  results  is low.35
examination of financial structure and economic development since Goldsmith's 1969 seminal
book, we had three goals.  First, we analyze how the size, activity, and efficiency of financial
systems -banks, other financial institutions and stock markets -differ across different income per
capita groups.  Second, we define different indicators of financial structure - financial
intermediaries relative to markets - and look for patterns as countries become richer.  Third, we
investigate legal, regulatory, and policy determinants of financial structure after controlling for
the level of GDP per capita.
Looking at financial systems across different income groups, a clear pattern emerges.
Banks, other financial intermediaries, and stock markets all get larger, more active and more
efficient as countries become richer. Thus, financial sector development tends to be greater at
higher income levels.
Next, we analyze differences in financial structure across different income groups. We
see that size measures of financial structure do not follow a clear pattern, as countries become
richer.  However, patterns do emerge when we look at activity and efficiency indicators. In
higher income countries stock markets become more active and more efficient relative to banks.
Using an aggregate index of financial structure we see that in higher income countries financial
systems tend to be more market-based.
We then classify countries as market-based or bank-based using this aggregate index of
financial structure. To avoid classifying a country as bank-based (market-based) when it has
poorly developed banks (markets) by international standards, we also distinguish those countries
with underdeveloped financial systems from those with developed financial systems.  We36
identify a country to have an underdeveloped financial system, if it has both poorly developed
banks and markets.
Finally, we analyze legal, regulatory, tax and macroeconomic determinants of financial
structure by looking at correlations and simple regressions that control for the level of real GDP
per capita. We see that countries vvith  a Common Law tradition, strong protection for
shareholder rights, good accounting standards, low levels of corruption and no explicit deposit
insurance tend to be more market-based, even after controlling for income.  On the other hand,
countries with a French Civil Law tradition, poor protection of shareholder and creditor rights,
poor contract enforcement, high levels of corruption, poor accounting standards, heavily
restricted banking systems, and high inflation tend to have underdeveloped financial systems in
general, even after conLtrolling  for income.
In this paper ouir  goal has not been to test specific hypotheses rigorously.  Rather, our
objectives have been to compile and compare different indicators of financial structure, make an
initial attempt at identifying certain interesting patterns and highlight suggestive correlations.
We hope the most important contribution of this paper will be to stimulate additional research in
the area of financial structures and economic development.37
APPENDIX: FINANCIAL SYSTEMS EVOLVE OVER TIME
A. Intermediaries Across Time
This section examines the evolution of financial systems across time.  In the case of
banks, data exist from the 1960s onward.  Thus, we examine how financial intermediary size as a
share of GDP changes across the last four decades.  The intertemporal patterns are very similar to
the cross-country patterns.
Banks and other financial intermediaries have grown as a share of GDP over the
decades.
To illustrate this, we first construct the income quartiles discussed in the text for the
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Figure IA presents these quartile graphs and makes two points.
First, the cross-country patterns illustrated with data from the 1990s holds for each of the four
decades. Second, financial intermediary size as a share of GDP grows in all income quartiles
over time.  Liquid Liabilities to GDP, Claims of Deposit Money Banks on the Private Sector /
GDP, and Claims of Other Financial Institutions on the Private Sector/GDP all rise as we move
from the 1960s  to the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. This can, perhaps, be seen more clearly in
Figure 2A. Figure 2A averages financial data across all countries with data for the entire sample
period for each of the decades. As depicted, banks and other financial institutions become larger
as a share of GDP over time.  While central banks tend to play smaller role in credit allocation in
richer countries, there is a small increase in this role over time.
B. Equity Markets Across Time
Stock markets have tended to become larger, more active, and more efficient over
time.  As shown in Figure 3A and 4A, Market Capitalization as a Share ofGDP, Total Value38
Traded as a Share of GDP, and Turnover Ratio have risen in all income quartiles when
comparing the 1970, 1  980s and the 1990s. Also note that the cross-country patterns observed in
the 1990s are consistent with those observed in the 1980s: As we move from the poorest quartile
of countries across to the highest quartile of countries, stock markets are more developed.
C. Non-Banks Financial Intermediaries Across Countries
Insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and other non-bank financial
intermediaries tend to become larger as a share of GDP as countries become richer. Here
we face considerable data problems because information on non-banks becomes scarce for earlier
years.  Figure 5A shows that insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and other non-
bank financial intermediaries tend to be larger in the 1990s than they were in the 1980s.
Furthermore, the cross-country patterns noted above hold across decades.39
REFERENCES
Beck, Thorsten; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; and Levine, Ross. "A New database on Financial
Development and Structure, " World Bank mimeo, January 1999.
Beck, Thorsten; Levine, Ross; and Loayza, Norman. "Finance and the Sources of Growth,"
World Bank mimeo, 1999.
Boyd, John H.; Levine, Ross; and Smith, Bruce D. "The Impact of Inflation on Financial Sector
Performance." January 1999. University of Virginia mimeo.
Dermiguc-Kunt, Asli and Levine, Ross. "Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediary
Growth: Stylized Facts," World Bank Economic Review, May, 1996.
Demirgiuc-Kunt,  Asli and Maksimovic, Vojislav. "Law, Finance, and Firm Growth," Journal of
Finance, December 1998, 53(6), pp.2107-2137.
Gertler, Mark. "Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: An Overview," Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, August 1988, 20(3, Pt. 2), pp. 559-88.
King, Robert G. and Levine, Ross.  "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1993a, 108(3), pp. 717-38.
King, Robert G. and Levine, Ross.  "Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth: Theory and
Evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, December 1993b, 32(3), pp. 513-42.
Laporta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei; and Vishny, Robert W. "Law and
Finance," Journal of Political Economy, December 1998, 106(6), pp. 1113-1155.
Laporta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei; and Vishny, Robert W. "Legal
Determinants of External Finance," Joumal of Finance,  July 1997, 52(3), pp. 1131-1150.
Levine, Ross. "Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda," Journal of
Economic Literature, June 1997, 35(2), pp. 688-726.
Levine, Ross. "The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth," Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, August 1998a, 30(3 pt.2), pp.596-613.
Levine, Ross. "Law, Finance, and Economic Growth", Journal of Financial Intermediation,
January 1999a.
Levine, Ross. "Napolean, Bourses, and Economic Growth with a Focus on Latin America," in
Market Augmenting Government (Eds: Omar Azfar and Chalres Cadwell)forthcoming
1999b.40
Levine, Ross; Loayza, Norman; and Beck, Thorsten. "Financial Intermediation and Growth:
Causality and Causes", mimeo, World Bank.
Levine, Ross and Zervos, Sara. "Stock  Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth," American
Economic Review, June 1998, 88(3), pp. 537-58.
Park, Yung Chul. "The Role of Finance in Economic Development in South Korean and
Taiwan," in Finance and Development: Issues and Experience (Ed. Alberto Giovannini),
1993, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, pp. 121-157.Table 1: Financial  Intermediary  and Equity  Market Development
Across  Countries
Country  name  GDP  Liquid  Bank  Claims  of Deposit  Claims  of Other  Central  Bank Overhead Bank  Net  Bank  Foreign  Public  Share  Market  Total  Value  Tumover
per  Liabilities  Assets  Money  Banks  on  Financial  Assets  / GDP  Costs  Interest  Concentration Bank  Assets  in Commercial capitalization Traded  i GDP  Ratio
capita  / GDP  / GDP  Private  Sector  Institutions  Margin  Index  in Total  Bank  Bank  / GDP
1990-95  /GDP  on Private  Sector  Assets  Assets
I GDP
Argentina  4039.12  0.15  0.21  0.15  0.00  0.04  0.10  0.07  0.50  0.16  0.34  0.11  0.04  0.34
Australia  14313.95  0.61  0.77  0.70  0.27  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.65  0.01  0.71  0.33  0.43
Austria  13177.30  0.89  1.26  0.93  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.72  0.03  0.98  0.12  0.08  0.64
Bangladesh  194.31  0.34  0.31  0.22  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.64  0.20  0.72  0.04  0.01  0.09
Barbados  4777.04  0.64  0.52  0.35  0.11  0.05  0.05  0.03  1.00  0.21  0.00  0.02
Belgium  14481.78  0.69  1.18  0.56  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.65  0.03  0.00  0.36  0.05  0.15
Bolivia  754.98  0.35  0.37  0.36  0.02  0.22  0.05  0.04  0.48  0.29  0.13  0.02  0.00  0.01
Brazil  2346.36  0.23  0.32  0.23  0.05  0.14  0.11  0.11  0.60  0.05  0.56  0.19  0.12  0.56
Canada  17284.79  0.76  0.66  0.57  0.24  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.58  0.07  0.00  0.59  0.29  0.47
Chile  2725.16  0.38  0.46  0.45  0.12  0.20  0.03  0.04  0.47  0.04  0.84  0.09  0.10
Colombia  1432.39  0.30  0.18  0.16  0.15  0.02  0.08  0.06  0.44  0.15  0.58  0.13  0.01  0.10
Costa  Rica  1866.60  0.37  0.17  0.15  0.01  0.10  0.06  0.05  0.80  0.05  0.33  0.07  0.00  0.03
Cyprus  6588.45  1.24  0.81  0.69  0.39  0.11  0.04  0.06  0.88  0.48  0.22  0.02  0.11
Denmark  17022.55  0.58  0.48  0.38  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.74  0.00  0.00  0.34  0.16  0.45
Ecuador  1322.40  0.24  0.17  0.17  0.04  0.09  0.08  0.07  0.40  0.06  0.00  0.10  0.01  0.14
Egypt  1042.35  0.81  0.63  0.26  0.04  0.34  0.02  0.01  0.65  0.10  0.02  0.14
Finland  15892.44  0.58  0.80  0.77  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.88  0.18  0.29  0.12  0.34
France  15232.41  0.64  1.02  0.89  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.41  0.06  0.74  0.33  0.17  0.50
Germany  16573.02  0.66  1.21  0.94  0.05  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.45  0.04  0.00  0.24  0.28  1.13
Ghana  553.23  0.16  0.06  0.05  0.16  0.06  0.08  0.89  0.79  0.15  0.00  0.03
Great  Britain  11794.31  0.96  1.16  1.14  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.56  1.13  0.55  0.48
Greece  6551.64  0.60  0.41  0.18  0.14  0.19  0.04  0.03  0.77  0.02  0.77  0.15  0.06  0.36
Honduras  751.32  0.29  0.25  0.21  0.04  0.07  0.04  0.07  0.44  0.19  0.05  0.02  0.67
Hong  Kong  10537.98  1.63  1.49  1.42  0.02  0.02  0.72  1.96  1.08  0.52
Iceland  18939.92  0.37  0.49  0.45  0.03  1.00  0.11  0.01  0.08
India  385.43  0.44  0.34  0.24  0.13  0.03  0.03  0.47  0.06  0.88  0.28  0.08  0.35
Indonesia  609.76  0.42  0.49  0.46  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.42  0.23  0.57  0.18  0.08  0.45
Iran  2397.40  0.44  0.22  0.20  0.06  0.26  0.04  0.01  0.21
Ireland  9014.40  0.52  0.36  0.29  0.37  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.74  0.31  0.00  0.26  0.14  0.62
Israel  9259.58  0.69  0.92  0.60  0.06  0.04  0.03  0.84  0.03  0.33  0.19  0.70
Italy  11504.72  0.65  0.74  0.52  0.10  0.04  0.03  0.36  0.00  0.65  0.17  0.08  0.42
Jamaica  1711.34  0.43  0.28  0.21  0.07  0.06  0.08  0.10  0.82  0.42  0.05  0.10
Japan  15705.68  1.91  1.31  1.17  0.85  0.05  0.01  0.02  0.22  0.00  0.00  0.79  0.28  0.36
Jordan  1288.78  1.11  0.71  0.62  0.07  0.21  0.03  0.02  0.91  0.65  0.12  0.20
Kenya  440.62  0.46  0.29  0.21  0.10  0.11  0.04  0.07  0.74  0.03  0.16  0.00  0.03
Korea  3908.74  0.65  0.55  0.53  0.59  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.31  0.37  0.44  1.22
Malaysia  2629.22  0.97  0.82  0.75  0.28  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.49  0.06  2.01  1.14  0.50
Mauritius  2124.69  0.68  0.54  0.39  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.94  0.03  0.27  0.01  0.05
Mexico  2951.55  0.25  0.24  0.22  0.03  0.01  0.05  0.05  0.58  0.01  0.00  0.32  0.13  0.41
Nepal  199.61  0.33  0.22  0.16  0.11  0.02  0.04  0.90  0.96  0.05  0.00  0.04
Netherlands  13954.71  0.83  1.12  0.90  0.55  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.74  0.10  0.00  0.69  0.43  0.56
New  Zealand  9492.46  0.73  0.85  0.78  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.69  0.00  0.49  0.14  0.27
Nigeria  550.95  0.20  0.11  0.08  0.03  0.20  0.08  0.05  0.81  0.08  0.06  0.00  0.01
Norway  20134.81  0.57  0.69  0.57  0.34  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.84  0.01  0.00  0.26  0.14  0.53
Pakistan  435.90  0.41  0.36  0.23  0.14  0.03  0.03  0.74  0.20  0.52  0.16  0.06  0.34
Panama  1950.45  0.53  0.58  0.56  0.21  0.02  0.02  0.42  0.42  0.09  0.00  0.04
Peru  1292.36  0.15  0.12  0.09  0.01  0.00  0.10  0.08  0.69  0.42  0.11  0.04  0.30
Philippines  734.06  0.45  0.37  0.28  0.05  0.09  0.05  0.04  0.47  0.30  0.19  0.52  0.15  0.26
Portugal  4822.10  0.71  0.79  0.54  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.46  0.06  0.68  0.13  0.05  0.38Country  name  GDP  Liquid  Bank  Claims  of Deposit  Claims  of Other  Central  Bank Overhead Bank Net  Bank  Foreign  Public  Share  Market  Total  Value  TuMover
per  Liabilities  Assets  Money  Banks  on  Financial  Assets  / GDP  Costs  Interest  Concentration  Bank  Assets  in Commercial capitalization Traded I GDP  Ratio
capita  GDP  / GDP  Private  Sector  Institutions  Margin  Index  In  Total Bank  Bank  / GDP
1990-95  1GDP  on Private  Sector  Assets  Assets
I GDP
Singapore  11152.47  1.12  0.95  0.83  0.17  0.0i  0.02  0.71  0.33  1.37  0.70  0.50
South  Africa  2379.26  0.44  0.66  0.61  0.51  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.77  0.01  1.66  0.15  0.08
Spain  7286.25  0.76  0.96  0.69  0.06  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.47  0.10  0.07  0.30  0.23  0.63
Sri  Lanka  537.67  0.37  0.27  0.21  0.10  0.05  0.05  0.82  0.56  0.16  0.02  0.12
Sweden  18981.50  0.47  0.54  0.46  0.73  0.06  0.03  0.03  0.88  0.03  0.26  0.62  0.33  0.47
Switzerland  19529.79  1.44  1.77  1.65  0.39  0.01  0.05  0.02  0.76  0.08  0.19  0.98  0.76  0.74
Thailand  1502.88  0.77  0.82  0.78  0.30  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.53  0.05  0.17  0.57  0.40  0.77
Trinidad  and  3684.84  0.52  0.37  0.30  0.17  0.08  0.04  0.04  0.76  0.12  0.01  0.10
Tobago
Tunisia  1534.16  0.47  0.55  0.51  0.13  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.59  0.24  0.73  0.10  0.01  0.09
Turkey  2258.77  0.22  0.19  0.13  0.01  0.06  0.06  0.10  0.44  0.01  0.51  0.14  0.16  1.04
United  States  19413.52  0.60  0.73  0.64  0.91  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.19  0.04  0.00  0.80  0.62  0.73
Uruguay  2514.33  0.39  0.28  0.24  0.15  0.06  0.06  0.87  0.17  0.68  0.01  0.00  0.03
Venezuela  3166.58  0.29  0.15  0.12  0.05  0,06  0.07  0.09  0.52  0.24  0.12  0.03  0.26
Zimbabwe  803.59  0.35  0.21  0.16  0.08  0.10  0.05  0.05  0.82  0.62  0.23  0.01  0.07
mean  6546.68  0.59  0.58  0.48  0.21  0.08  0.04  0.04  0.65  0.15  0.35  0.39  0.17  0.35Table 2: Correlations of Financial Intermediary and
Equity  Market Development with GDP per capita
Correlation  p-value
Liquid Liabilities  / GDP  0.465  (0.001)
Bank Assets / GDP  0.663  (0.001)
Claims of Deposit Money Banks on Private Sector / GDP  0.639  (0.001)
Claims of Other Financial Institutions on Private Sector I GDP  0.636  (0.001)
Central Bank Assets / GDP  -0.442  (0.001)
Overhead Costs  -0.353  (0.005)
Bank Net Interest Margin  -0.443  (0.001)
Bank Concentration Index  0.017  (0.898)
Foreign Bank Assets in Total Bank Assets  -0.371  (0.009)
Public Share in Total Bank Assets  -0.462  (0.004)
Market Capitalization / GDP  0.282  (0.025)
Total Value Traded / GDP  0.409  (0.001)
Turnover Ratio  0.424  (0.001)Table 3: Overall Size  and Efficiency of the Financial Sector Across Countries
Country  name  GDP per  capita Overall  Size  [(domestic  overall  efficiency  overall  efficiency  overall  efficiency  overall  efficiency
1  990-95  assets  of deposit  money  (total  value  traded  I  (total value  traded  ;  (turnover  i  (tumover  i
banks  + stock  market  net  interest  margin)  overhead  costs)  net interest  margin)  overuead  costs)
capitalization)  / GDPI
Argentina  4039.12  0.32  0.50  0.36  4.70  3.38
Australia  14313.95  1.48  16.30  12.87  21.10  16.67
Austria  13177.30  1.38  4.22  2.90  34.37  23.65
Bangladesh  194.31  0.35  0.70  0.26  11.30  4.20
Barbados  4777.04  0.74  0.11  0.08  0.47  0.34
Belgium  14481.78  1.53  2.37  1.87  7.03  5.56
Bolivia  754.98  0.38
Brazil  2346.36  0.50  1.09  1.10  5.17  5.20
Canada  17284.79  1.24  16.80  12.86  26.76  20.49
Chile  2725.16  1.30  1.96  2.78  2.20  3.13
Colombia  1432.39  0.31  0.21  0.16  1.51  1.18
Costa  Rca  1866.60  0.24  0.03  0.02  0.52  0.43
Cyprus  6588.45  1.03  0.39  0.57  1.77  2.57
Denmark  17C22.55  0.82  3.31  4.43  9.53  12.74
Ecuador  1322.40  0.28  0.19  0.18  2.07  1.91
Egypt  1042.35  0.73  1.44  1.13  10.23  7.98
Finland  15892.44  1.09  7.42  7.03  21.22  20.12
France  15232.41  1.35  4.91  3.87  14.47  11.41
Germany  16573.02  1.45  11.18  10.01  45.39  40.64
Ghana  553.23  0.21  0.05  0.07  0.38  0.53
Great  Britain  11794.31  2.29  26.97  20.65  23.54  18.02
Greece  6551.64  0.56  1.73  1.48  10.55  9.01
Honduras  751.32  0.30  0.29  0.48  9.57  16.09
Hong  Kong  10537.98  3.45  45.54  44.90  22.10  21.79
Iceland  18939.92  0.60
India  385.43  0.62  2.58  2.86  11.72  13.02
Indonesia  609.76  0.68  1.85  2.70  10.76  15.68
Iran  2397.40  0.26
Ireland  9014.40  0.63  9.95  19.95  43.49  87.18
Israel  9259.58  1.25  5.86  5.16  22.13  19.51
Italy  11504.72  0.91  2.18  2.15  12.26  12.07
Jamaica  1711.34  0.70  0.55  0.63  1.09  1.25
Japan  15705.68  2.10  15.84  20.17  19.80  25.22
Jordan  1288.78  1.36  5.35  4.82  8.54  7.69
Kenya  440.62  0.45  0.08  0.13  0.44  0.75
Korea  3908.74  0.92  19.77  17.86  54.93  49.60
Malaysia  2629.22  2.83  44.24  74.91  19.45  32.93
Mauritius  2124.69  0.81  0.45  0.75  1.63  2.74
Mexico  2951.55  0.56  2.54  2.44  8.21  7.88
Nepal  199.61  0.27  0.06  0.10  0.95  1.56
Netherlands  13954.71  1.80  28.83  38.70  37.45  50.27
New  Zealand  9492.46  1.34  6.06  5.66  11.35  10.60Country  name  GDP  per capita Overall  Size  [(domestic  overall  efficiency  overall  efficiency  overall  efficiency  overall  efficiency
1990-95  assets  of deposit  money  (total  value  traded  /  (total  value  traded  /  (tumover  /  (tumover  /
banks  + stock  market  net interest  margin)  overhead  costs)  net interest  margin)  overhead  costs)
capitalization)  / GDP]
Nigeria  f 50.95  0.17
Norway  20134.81  0.95  4.82  5.94  17.88  22.03
Pakistan  435.90  0.52  2.17  2.05  12.14  11.46
Panama  1950.45  0.66  0.12  0.15  1.76  2.13
Peru  1292.36  0.23  0.51  0.39  3.91  3.05
Philippines  734.06  0.88  3.88  3.15  6.73  5.46
Portugal  4e22.10  0.92  1.55  1.93  12.55  15.64
Singapore  11152.47  2.32  32.20  54.62  23.04  39.08
South  Africa  2379.26  2.32  3.46  4.07  1.98  2.33
Spain  7286.25  1.27  6.30  6.65  17.17  18.11
Sri  Lanka  E,37.67  0.43  0.43  0.45  2.44  2.57
Sweden  18981.50  1.16  12.91  12.24  18.43  17.48
Switzerland  19529.79  2.75  47.04  15.76  45.92  15.38
Thailand  1502.88  1.39  13.70  19.72  26.35  37.93
Trinidad  and  Tobago  3684.84  0.49  0.38  0.32  2.54  2.13
Tunisia  1534.16  0.65  0.52  0.59  3.99  4.60
Turkey  2258.77  0.33  1.61  2.57  10.72  17.06
United  States  19413.52  1.53  15.76  16.95  18.64  20.05
Uruguay  2514.33  0.30  U
Venezuela  3166.58  0.27  0.38  0.49  3.03  3.84
Zimbabwe  803.59  0.44  0.30  0.30  1.48  1.50Table  4: Correlations of Overall Size and Efficiency of the Financial Sector with GDP  per capita
Correlation 
p-value
Overall  Size  [(domestic  assets  of deposit  money  banks 
0.519  (0.001)
+ stock  market  capitalization)  / GDP)
overall  efficiency (total  value  traded  I bank  net interest  margin) 
0.470  (0.001)
overall  efficiency (total  value  traded  / overhead  costs) 
0.304  (0.020)
overall  efficiency (tumover  ratio  / bank  net Interest  margin) 
0.574  (0.001)
overall  efficiency  (tumover  ratio  / overhead  costs) 
0.400  (0.002)47
Table 5: Banks vs. Capitalization
Country  GDP  Domestic  assets  of  Market  Domestic  assets  of deposit  money
Name  per  capita  deposit  money  banks  I GDP  capitalization  J GDP  banks  / Market  capitalization
South  Africa  2379.26  0.66  1.66  0.40
Malaysia  2629.22  0.82  2.01  0.41
Chile  2725.16  0.46  0.84  0.55
Jamaica  1711.34  0.28  0.42  0.67
Singapore  11152.47  0.95  1.37  0.70
Philippines  734.06  0.37  0.52  0.71
Mexico  2951.55  0.24  0.32  0.76
Hong  Kong  10537.98  1.49  1.96  0.76
Sweden  18981.50  0.54  0.62  0.86
United  States  19413.52  0.73  0.80  0.91
Zinbabwe  803.59  0.21  0.23  0.95
Peru  1292.36  0.12  0.11  1.01
Great  Britain  11794.31  1.16  1.13  1.03
Australia  14313.95  0.77  0.71  1.08
Jordan  1288.78  0.71  0.65  1.10
Canada  17284.79  0.66  0.59  1.12
Venezuela  3166.58  0.15  0.12  1.21
India  385.43  0.34  0.28  1.24
Colombia  1432.39  0.18  0.13  1.34
Turkey  2258.77  0.19  0.14  1.35
Ireland  9014.40  0.36  0.26  1.36
Denmark  17022.55  0.48  0.34  1.40
Thailand  1502.88  0.82  0.57  1.44
Korea  3908.74  0.55  0.37  1.48
Netherlands  13954.71  1.12  0.69  1.63
Japan  15705.68  1.31  0.79  1.66
Ecuador  1322.40  0.17  0.10  1.68
Sri Lanka  537.67  0.27  0.16  1.69
Brazil  2346.36  0.32  0.19  1.70
New  Zealand  9492.46  0.85  0.49  1.73
Kenya  440.62  0.29  0.16  1.80
Switzerland  19529.79  1.77  0.98  1.80
Nigeria  550.95  0.11  0.06  1.88
Argentina  4039.12  0.21  0.11  1.90
Mauritius  2124.69  0.54  0.27  2.04
Pakistan  435.90  0.36  0.16  2.17
Barbados  4777.04  0.52  0.21  2.44
Costa  Rica  1866.60  0.17  0.07  2.51
Indonesia  609.76  0.49  0.18  2.67
Norway  20134.81  0.69  0.26  2.69
Finland  15892.44  0.80  0.29  2.71
Israel  9259.58  0.92  0.33  2.76
Greece  6551.64  0.41  0.15  2.78
Trinidad  and  3684.84  0.37  0.12  2.95
Tobago
France  15232.41  1.02  0.33  3.11
Spain  7286.25  0.96  0.30  3.20
Belgium  14481.78  1.18  0.36  3.31
Cyprus  6588.45  0.81  0.22  3.73
Nepal  199.61  0.22  0.05  4.30
Italy  11504.72  0.74  0.17  4.45
Iceland  18939.92  0.49  0.11  4.50
Germany  16573.02  1.21  0.24  5.01
Honduras  751.32  0.25  0.05  5.22
Iran  2397.40  0.22  0.04  5.24
Tunisia  1534.16  0.55  0.10  5.79
Portugal  4822.10  0.79  0.13  5.84
Egypt  1042.35  0.63  0.10  6.10
Panama  1950.45  0.58  0.09  6.74
Bangladesh  194.31  0.31  0.04  7.76
Austria  13177.30  1.26  0.12  10.2448
Table 6: Banks vs. Other Financial  Institutions
Country  GDP  Domestic  asisets  of  Domestic  assets  of  Domestic  assets  of  deposit  money  banks/
name  per  capita deposit  money  banks  / GDP  other  fin.  instit.  I GDP  domestic  assets  of other  fin.  instit.
Sweden  18981.50  0.54  0.82  0.66
United  States  19413.52  0.73  1.11  0.66
Ireland  9014.40  0.36  0.45  0.81
South  Africa  2379.26  0.66  0.77  0.86
Korea  3908.74  0.55  0.60  0.92
Japan  15705.68  1.31  1.41  0.93
Colombia  1432.39  0.18  0.19  0.95
Netherlands  13954.71  1.12  0.96  1.16
Zimbabwe  803.59  0.21  0.15  1.41
Norway  20134.81  0.69  0.46  1.51
Greece  6551.64  0.41  0.27  1.54
Trinidad  and  3684.84  0.37  0.20  1.87
Tobago
Cyprus  6588.45  0.81  0.39  2.06
Kenya  440.62  0.29  0.13  2.15
Thailand  1502.88  0.82  0.34  2.42
Mexico  2951.55  0.24  0.10  2.46
Canada  17284.79  0.66  0.26  2.56
Malaysia  2629.22  0.82  0.31  2.60
Venezuela  3166.58  0.15  0.06  2.64
Australia  14313.95  0.77  0.27  2.81
Iran  2397.40  0.22  0.06  3.35
Chile  2725.16  0.46  0.13  3.56
Jamaica  1711.34  0.28  0.08  3.68
Nigeria  550.95  0.11  0.03  3.73
Switzerland  19529.79  1.77  0.44  3.98
Tunisia  1534.16  0.55  0.13  4.20
Ecuador  1322.40  0.17  0.04  4.24
Barbados  4777.04  0.52  0.11  4.67
Honduras  751.32  0.25  0.05  4.90
Brazil  2346.36  0.32  0.06  5.06
Singapore  11152.47  0.95  0.18  5.25
Philippines  734.06  0.37  0.06  6.65
New  Zealand  9492.46  0.85  0.09  9.94
Jordan  1288.78  0.71  0.07  10.27
Egypt  1042.35  0.63  0.06  11.42
Peru  1292.36  0.12  0.01  11.48
Turkey  2258.77  0.19  0.01  15.26
Spain  7286.25  0.96  0.06  16.47
Germany  16573.02  1.21  0.05  22.68
Austria  13177.30  1.26  0.05  23.35
Bolivia  754.98  0.37  0.02  24.31
Costa  Rica  1866.60  0.17  0.01  29.5449
Table 7: Bank Credit vs. Trading
Country  GDP  Claims  of deposit  money  Total  value  Claims  of dep.  Money  banks  on
Name  per  capita  banks  on private  sector  I GDP  traded  I GDP  private  sector  I total  value traded
Malaysia  2629.22  0.75  1.14  0.66
Turkey  2258.77  0.13  0.16  0.85
United  States  19413.52  0.64  0.62  1.0
Singapore  11152.47  0.83  0.70  1.18
Korea  3908.74  0.53  0.44  1.21
Hong  Kong  10537.98  1.42  1.08  1.32
Sweden  18981.50  0.46  0.33  1.38
Mexico  2951.55  0.22  0.13  1.71
Philippines  734.06  0.28  0.15  1.87
Brazil  2346.36  0.23  0.12  1.92
Canada  17284.79  0.57  0.29  1.93
Thailand  1502.88  0.78  0.40  1.96
Great  Britain  11794.31  1.14  0.55  2.06
Ireland  9014.40  0.29  0.14  2.07
Australia  14313.95  0.70  0.33  2.10
Netherlands  13954.71  0.90  0.43  2.11
Switzerland  19529.79  1.65  0.76  2.18
Denmark  17022.55  0.38  0.16  2.40
Peru  1292.36  0.09  0.04  2.44
Spain  7286.25  0.69  0.23  2.98
Greece  6551.64  0.18  0.06  3.13
India  385.43  0.24  0.08  3.17
Israel  9259.58  0.60  0.19  3.20
Germany  16573.02  0.94  0.28  3.40
Venezuela  3166.58  0.12  0.03  3.52
Pakistan  435.90  0.23  0.06  3.78
Jamaica  1711.34  0.21  0.05  3.92
Norway  20134.81  0.57  0.14  4.01
Japan  15705.68  1.17  0.28  4.11
South  Africa  2379.26  0.61  0.15  4.14
Argentina  4039.12  0.15  0.04  4.17
Jordan  1288.78  0.62  0.12  4.98
France  15232.41  0.89  0.17  5.21
Chile  2725.16  0.45  0.09  5.28
New  Zealand  9492.46  0.78  0.14  5.44
Indonesia  609.76  0.46  0.08  5.99
Finland  15892.44  0.77  0.12  6.55
Italy  11504.72  0.52  0.08  6.90
Sri Lanka  537.67  0.21  0.02  9.80
Honduras  751.32  0.21  0.02  10.39
Belgium  14481.78  0.56  0.05  10.81
Zimbabwe  803.59  0.16  0.01  11.15
Portugal  4822.10  0.54  0.05  11.35
Colombia  1432.39  0.16  0.01  11.64
Austria  13177.30  0.93  0.08  11.91
Ecuador  1322.40  0.17  0.01  12.78
Egypt  1042.35  0.26  0.02  13.58
Trinidad  and  Tobago  3684.84  0.30  0.01  21.03
Iran  2397.40  0.20  0.01  27.07
Mauritius  2124.69  0.39  0.01  27.14
Cyprus  6588.45  0.69  0.02  28.39
Bangladesh  194.31  0.22  0.01  38.61
Kenya  440.62  0.21  0.00  42.55
Tunisia  1534.16  0.51  0.01  43.98
Iceland  18939.92  0.45  0.01  61.65
Nepal  199.61  0.16  0.00  67.27
Costa  Rica  1866.60  0.15  0.00  98.50
Barbados  4777.04  0.35  0.00  103.40
Panama  1950.45  0.56  0.00  196.1850
Table 8: Other Financial Institutions vs. Trading
Country  GDP  Claims  of other financial  Total  value  Claims  of other  fin. instit.  on
name  per  capita  institutions  on private  sector/  traded  I GDP  private  sector  / total value  traded
GDP
Turkey  2258.77  0.01  0.16  0.06
Germany  16573.02  0.05  0.28  0.18
Peru  1292.36  0.01  0.04  0.23
Singapore  11152.47  0.17  0.70  0.24
Malaysia  2629.22  0.28  1.14  0.25
Spain  7286.25  0.06  0.23  0.25
Mexico  2951.55  0.03  0.13  0.26
New  Zealand  9492.46  0.04  0.14  0.29
Philippines  734.06  0.05  0.15  0.33
Brazil  2346.36  0.05  0.12  0.39
Switzerland  19529.79  0.39  0.76  0.51
Jordan  1288.78  0.07  0.12  0.56
Thailand  1502.88  0.30  0.40  0.75
Australia  14313.95  0.27  0.33  0.81
Canada  17284.79  0.24  0.29  0.83
Jamaica  1711.34  0.07  0.05  1.26
Netherlands  13954.71  0,55  0.43  1.28
Korea  3908.74  0.59  0.44  1.33
Chile  2725.16  0.12  0.09  1.46
United  States  19413.52  0.91  0.62  1.49
Venezuela  3166.58  0.05  0.03  1.50
Sweden  18981.50  0.73  0.33  2.18
Honduras  751.32  0.04  0.02  2.20
Egypt  1042.35  0.04  0.02  2.22
Greece  6551.64  0.14  0.06  2.35
Norway  20134.81  0.34  0.14  2.40
Ireland  9014.40  0.37  0.14  2.63
Japan  15705.68  0.85  0.28  2.98
Ecuador  1322.40  0.04  0.01  3.09
South  Africa  2379.26  0.51  0.15  3.42
Costa  Rica  1866.60  0.01  0.00  3.62
Zimbabwe  803.59  0.08  0.01  5.80
Iran  2397.40  0.06  0.01  8.69
Tunisia  1534.16  0.13  0.01  11.27
Colombia  1432.39  0.15  0.01  11.38
Trinidad  and  3684.84  0.17  0.01  12.00
Tobago
Cyprus  6588.45  0.39  0.02  16.22
Kenya  440.62  0.10  0.00  20.35
Barbados  4777.04  0.11  0.00.  32.4451
Table 9: Trading vs. Overhead  Costs
Country  GDP  total  value  Overhead  total value  traded'
name  per capita  traded  costs  overhead  oosts
Panama  1950.45  0.00  0.02  0.00
Nepal  199.61  0.00  0.02  0.00
Costa  Rica  1866.60  0.00  0.06  0.00
Bangladesh  194.31  0.01  0.02  0.00
Barbados  4777.04  0.00  0.05  0.00
Kenya  440.62  0.00  0.04  0.00
Tunisia  1534.16  0.01  0.02  0.00
Ghana  553.23  0.00  0.06  0.00
Mauritius  2124.69  0.01  0.02  0.00
Egypt  1042.35  0.02  0.02  0.00
Trinidad  and  Tobago  3684.84  0.01  0.04  0.00
Zimbabwe  803.59  0.01  0.05  0.00
Honduras  751.32  0.02  0.04  0.00
Ireland  9014.40  0.14  0.01  0.00
Ecuador  1322.40  0.01  0.08  0.00
Sri  Lanka  537.67  0.02  0.05  0.00
Cyprus  6588.45  0.02  0.04  0.00
Colombia  1432.39  0.01  0.08  0.00
Portugal  4822.10  0.05  0.02  0.00
Belgium  14481.78  0.05  0.03  0.00
Pakistan  435.90  0.06  0.03  0.00
Finland  15892.44  0.12  0.02  0.00
India  385.43  0.08  0.03  0.00
Austria  13177.30  0.08  0.03  0.00
Indonesia  609.76  0.08  0.03  0.00
Venezuela  3166.58  0.03  0.07  0.00
Greece  6551.64  0.06  0.04  0.00
Chile  2725.16  0.09  0.03  0.00
Italy  11504.72  0.08  0.04  0.00
Jordan  1288.78  0.12  0.03  0.00
Norway  20134.81  0.14  0.02  0.00
New  Zealand  9492.46  0.14  0.03  0.00
Argentina  4039.12  0.04  0.10  0.00
Peru  1292.36  0.04  0.10  0.00
Japan  15705.68  0.28  0.01  0.00
Jamaica  1711.34  0.05  0.08  0.00
Netherlands  13954.71  0.43  0.01  0.00
South  Africa  2379.26  0.15  0.04  0.01
Denmark  17022.55  0.16  0.04  0.01
Mexico  2951.55  0.13  0.05  0.01
Canada  17284.79  0.29  0.02  0.01
Israel  9259.58  0.19  0.04  0.01
Philippines  734.06  0.15  0.05  0.01
France  15232.41  0.17  0.04  0.01
Germany  16573.02  0.28  0.03  0.01
Spain  7286.25  0.23  0.03  0.01
Thailand  1502.88  0.40  0.02  0.01
Australia  14313.95  0.33  0.03  0.01
Sweden  18981.50  0.33  0.03  0.01
Singapore  11152.47  0.70  0.01  0.01
Turkey  2258.77  0.16  0.06  0.01
Korea  3908.74  0.44  0.02  0.01
Brazil  2346.36  0.12  0.11  0.01
Great  Britain  11794.31  0.55  0.03  0.01
Malaysia  2629.22  1.14  0.02  0.02
United  States  19413.52  0.62  0.04  0.02
Hong  Kong  10537.98  1.08  0.02  0.03
Switzerland  19529.79  0.76  0.05  0.0452
Irable 10: Trading vs. Interest Margin
Country  GDP  total value  net interest total value  traded'
name  per  capita  traded  margin  net interest
margin
Bangladesh  194.31  0.01  0.01  0.00
Flanama  1950.45  0.00  0.02  0.00
Costa  Rica  1866.60  0.00  0.05  0.00
Nepal  199.61  0.00  0.04  0.00
Elarbados  4777.04  0.00  0.03  0.00
Tunisia  1534.16  0.01  0.02  0.00
Egypt  1042.35  0.02  0.01  0.00
Ghana  553.23  0.00  0.08  0.00
Kenya  440.62  0.00  0.07  0.00
Mauritius  2124.69  0.01  0.03  0.00
Trinidad  and Tobago  3684.84  0.01  0.04  0.00
Zimbabwe  803.59  0.01  0.05  0.00
Colombia  1432.39  0.01  0.06  0.00
Ecuador  1322.40  0.01  0.07  0.00
Sri Lanka  537.67  0.02  0.05  0.00
Belgium  14481.78  0.05  0.02  0.00
Flonduras  751.32  0.02  0.07  0.00
F'ortugal  4822.10  0.05  0.03  0.00
Austria  13177.30  0.08  0.02  0.00
Cyprus  6588.45  0.02  0.06  0.00
FPakistan  435.90  0.06  0.03  0.00
Finland  15892.44  0.12  0.02  0.00
Greece  6551.64  0.06  0.03  0.00
Ireland  9014.40  0.14  0.01  0.00
iidia  385.43  0.08  0.03  0.00
Italy  11504.72  0.08  0.03  0.00
Argentina  4039.12  0.04  0.07  0.00
Jordan  1288.78  0.12  0.02  0.00
Venezuela  3166.58  0.03  0.09  0.00
FPeru  1292.36  0.04  0.08  0.00
Indonesia  609.76  0.08  0.04  0.00
New  Zealand  9492.46  0.14  0.02  O.00
Chile  2725.16  0.09  0.04  0.00
Norway  20134.81  0.14  0.03  0.00
Canada  17284.79  0.29  0.02  0.01
Japan  15705.68  0.28  0.02  0.01
Jamaica  1711.34  0.05  0.10  0.01
FPhilippines  734.06  0.15  0.04  0.01
France  15232.41  0.17  0.03  0.01
Israel  9259.58  0.19  0.03  0.01
Mexico  2951.55  0.13  0.05  0.01
South  Africa  2379.26  0.15  0.04  0.01
Netherlands  13954.71  0.43  0.01  0.01
Australia  14313.95  0.33  0.02  0.01
Germany  16573.02  0.28  0.02  0.01
Denmark  17022.55  0.16  0.05  0.01
Spain  7286.25  0.23  0.04  0.01
Sweden  18981.50  0.33  0.03  0.01
Korea  3908.74  0.44  0.02  0.01
CGreat  Britain  11794.31  0.55  0.02  0.01
lhailand  1502.88  0.40  0.03  0.01
'iwitzerland  19529.79  0.76  0.02  0.01
Elrazil  2346.36  0.12  0.11  0.01
Turkey  2258.77  0.16  0.10  0.02
Singapore  11152.47  0.70  0.02  0.02
United  States  19413.52  0.62  0.04  0.02
Hong  Kong  10537.98  1.08  0.02  0.03
Malaysia  2629.22  1.14  0.03  0.0353
Table 11: Financial Structure  Across  Countries
Country  GDP  Structure  Market  capitalization  / Domestic  Trading  Trading  vs.
name  per  capita  index  assets  of  deposit  money  banks  vs.  Banks  overhead  costs
Panama  1950.45  -0.92  0.15  0.01  0.00
Bangladesh  194.31  -0.90  0.13  0.03  0.00
Tunisia  1534.16  -0.88  0.17  0.02  0.00
Nepal  199.61  -0.87  0.23  0.01  0.00
Egypt  1042.35  -0.82  0.16  0.07  0.00
Costa  Rica  1866.60  -0.79  0.40  0.01  0.00
Barbados  4777.04  -0.78  0.41  0.01  0.00
Cyprus  6588.45  -0.77  0.27  0.04  0.00
Honduras  751.32  -0.75  0.19  0.10  0.00
Portugal  4822.10  -0.75  0.17  0.09  0.00
Trinidad  and  3684.84  -0.74  0.34  0.05  0.00
Tobago
Austria  13177.30 -0.73  0.10  0.08  0.00
Mauritius  2124.69  -0.70  0.49  0.04  0.00
Kenya  440.62  -0.69  0.56  0.02  0.00
Belgium  14481.78 -0.66  0.30  0.09  0.00
Italy  11504.72 -0.57  0.22  0.15  0.00
Ecuador  1322.40  -0.56  0.60  0.08  0.00
Sri  Lanka  537.67  -0.54  0.59  0.10  0.00
Finland  15892.44 -0.53  0.37  0.15  0.00
Indonesia  609.76  -0.50  0.37  0.17  0.00
Colombia  1432.39  -0.47  0.75  0.09  0.00
Pakistan  435.90  -0.38  0.46  0.26  0.00
Zimbabwe  803.59  -0.34  1.06  0.09  0.00
Greece  6551.64  -0.34  0.36  0.32  0.00
Norway  20134.81  -0.33  0.37  0.25  0.00
New  Zealand  9492.46  -0.29  0.58  0.18  0.00
Argentina  4039.12  -0.25  0.53  0.24  0.00
Japan  15705.68 -0.19  0.60  0.24  0.00
France  15232.41 -0.17  0.32  0.19  0.01
Venezuela  3166.58  -0.15  0.83  0.28  0.00
India  385.43  -0.14  0.81  0.32  0.00
Jordan  1288.78  -0.14  0.91  0.20  0.00
Germany  16573.02 -0.10  0.20  0.29  0.01
Israel  9259.58  -0.06  0.36  0.31  0.01
Ireland  9014.40  -0.06  0.73  0.48  0.00
Spain  7286.25  0.02  0.31  0.34  0.01
Netheriands  13954.71  0.11  0.61  0.47  0.00
Denmark  17022.55  0.15  0.72  0.42  0.01
Peru  1292.36  0.16  0.99  0.41  0.00
Chile  2725.16  0.25  1.80  0.19  0.00
Jamaica  1711.34  0.28  1.49  0.26  0.00
Thailand  1502.88  0.39  0.69  0.51  0.01
Canada  17284.79  0.41  0.90  0.52  0.01
Australia  14313.95  0.50  0.93  0.48  0.01
Brazil  2346.36  0.65  0.59  0.52  0.01
Mexico  2951.55  0.68  1.32  0.58  0.01
Philippines  734.06  0.71  1.40  0.54  0.01
South  Africa  2379.26  0.83  2.50  0.24  0.01
Korea  3908.74  0.89  0.68  0.82  0.01
Sweden  18981.50  0.91  1.16  0.72  0.01
Great  Britain  11794.31  0.92  0.97  0.48  0.01
Singapore  11152.47  1.18  1.43  0.85  0.01
Turkey  2258.77  1.23  0.74  1.18  0.01
United  States  19413.52  1.96  1.09  0.96  0.02
Switzerland  19529.79  2.03  0.55  0.46  0.04
Hong  Kong  10537.98  2.10  1.32  0.76  0.03
Malaysia  2629.22  2.93  2.47  1.52  0.0254
Table 12: Country Classification of Financial Structure
Finacially  underdevelopecl  Finacially  developed
economies  economies
Country  Structure  Country  Structure
name  index  name  index
Bank-based  economies  Bank-based  economies
Bangladesh  -0.90  Panama  -0.92
Nepal  -0.87  Tunisia  -0.88
Egypt  -0.82  Cyprus  -0.77
Costa  Rica  -0.79  Portugal  -0.75
Barbados  -0.78  Austria  -0.73
Honduras  -0.75  Belgium  -0.66
Trinidad  and  Tobago  -0.74  Italy  -0.57
Mauritius  -0.70  Fintand  -0.53
Kenya  -0.69  Norway  -0.33
Ecuador  -0.56  New  Zealand  -0.29
Sri  Lanka  -0.54  Japan  -0.19
Indonesia  -0.50  France  -0.17
Colombia  -0.47  Jordan  -0.14
Pakistan  -0.38  Germany  -0.10
Zimbabwe  -0.34  Israel  -0.06
Greece  -0.34  Spain  0.02
Argentina  -0.25
Venezuela  -0.15  group-mean  -0.44
India  -0.14
Ireland  -0.06  Market-based  economies
Netherlands  0.11
group-mean  -0.54  Thailand  0.39
Canada  0.41
Market-based  economies  Australia  0.50
Denmark  0.15  South  Africa  0.83
Peru  0.16  Korea  0.89
Chile  0.25  Sweden  0.91
Jamaica  0.28  Great  Britain  0.92
Brazil  0.65  Singapore  1.18
Mexico  0.68  United  States  1.96
Philippines  0.71  Switzerland  2.03
Turkey  1.23  Hong  Kong  2.10
Malaysia  2.93
group-mean  0.52  group-mean  1.17
Financially  underdeveloped  -0.24  Financially  developed  countries  0.28
countries
Overall  mean  0.03Table 13: Determinants  of Financial Structure  -
Means  tests
English  French  Srights  Crights  Enforce  Corrupt  Account  Restrict  Deposit  Dividend  Capital  Gain  Inflation
insurance  Disadvantage  Disadvantage
Underdeveloped 
0.38  0.56  2.86  2.29  5.49  4.60  49.53  2.50  0.61  0.23  0.19  25.23
Bank-based 
0.19  0.50  2.54  2.08  8.68  7.37  63.17  1.90  0.83  0.18  0.14  3.91
Market-based 
0.69  0.08  3.69  2.54  8.54  8.44  71.69  1.96  0.54  0.16  0.09  4.31
Means-test  (t-statistics)
Underdeveloped  vs. Bank  0.19  0.06  0.33  0.20  -3.18  -2.77  -13.63  0.61  -0.22  0.05  0.05  21.32
(0.175)  (0.704)  (0.464)  (0.702)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (O.013)  (0.174)  (0.451)  (0.565)  (0.037)
Underdeveloped  vs. Market  -0.31  0.48  -0.83  -0.25  -3.04  -3.84  -22.16  0.54  0.07  0.07  0.10  20.92
(0.059)  (0.002)  (0.061)  (0.635)  (0Q001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.017)  (0Q656)  (0.249)  (0.252)  (0.064)
Bank  vs. Market 
-0.50  0.42  -1.15  -0.46  0.14  -1.07  -8.53  -0.07  0.29  0.02  0.05  -0.40
(0.005)  (0.013)  (0.040)  (0.346)  (0.809)  (0.195)  (0.021)  (0.769)  (0.124)  (0.768)  (0.619)  (0.690)
IJnTable 14: Determinants  of Financial Structure -
Correlations
Variable  English  French  Srights  Crights  Enforce  Corrupt  Account  Restrict  Deposit  Dividend  Capital  Gain  Inflation
insurance  Disadvantage  bisadvantage
Underdeveloped  correlation  -0.032  0.249  -0.096  -0.013  -0.728  -0.626  -0.654  0.442  -0.070  0.178  0.162  0.346
coefficient  (0.803)  (0.049)  (0.516)  (0.934)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.610)  (0.235)  (0.283)  (0.005)
63  63  48  46  48  59  40  45  56  46  46  63
regression  -0.165  0.142  -0.032  -0.095  -0.135  -0.055  -0.014  0.171  0.197  0.028  0.147  0.004
coefficient  (0.107)  (0.158)  (0.433)  (0.014)  (0,032)  (0.133)  (0.003)  (0.051)  (0.077)  (0.928)  (0.498)  (0.027)
63  63  48  46  48  59  40  45  56  46  46  63
Bank  correlation  -0.250  0.065  -0.215  -0.096  0.429  0.275  0.115  -0.270  0.208  -0.062  -0.028  -0.222
coefficient  (0.048)  (0.611)  (0.142)  (0.525)  (0.002)  (0.035)  (0.482)  (0.072)  (0.125)  (0.682)  (0.854)  (0.080)
63  63  48  46  48  59  40  45  56  46  46  63
regression  -0.161  0.120  -0.076  0.018  0.044  -0.029  -0.006  -0.084  0.057  0.129  0.057  -0.002
coefficient  (0.133)  (0.256)  (0Q095)  (0.694)  (0.541)  (0.463)  (0.294)  (0.402)  (0.619)  (0.706)  (0.813)  (0.226)
63  63  48  46  48  59  40  45  56  46  46  63
Market  correlation  0.308  -0.377  0.323  0.108  0.388  0.460  0.564  -0.221  -0.120  -0.137  -0.152  -0.187
coefficient  (0.014)  (0.002)  (0.025)  (0.476)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.145)  (0.379)  (0.364)  (0.315)  (0.141)
63  63  48  46  48  59  40  45  56  46  46  63  -
regression  0.326  -0.263  0.108  0.077  0.091  0.084  0.021  -0.088  -0.253  -0.156  -0.204  -0.002
coefficient  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.020)  (0.118)  (0.224)  (0.021)  (0.001)  (0.424)  (0.031)  (0.677)  (0.443)  (0.349)
63  63  48  46  48  59  40  45  56  46  46  63
Structure  index  correlation  0.184  -0.260  0.310  -0.004  0.182  0.375  0.460  -0.158  -0.054  -0.157  *0.230  0.091
coefficient  (0.170)  (0.051)  (0.036)  (0.979)  (0.227)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.312)  (0.712)  (0.308)  (0.133)  (0.501)
57  57  46  44  46  54  38  43  50  44  44  57
regression  0.418  -0.354  0.195  0.037  -0.053  0.144  0.044  -0.148  40.338  -0.581  -0.707  0.004
coefficient  (0.060)  (0.111)  (0.035)  (0.709)  (0.722)  (0.080)  (0.001)  (0.507)  (0.204)  (0.434)  (0.177)  (0.230)
57  57  46  44  46  54  38  43  50  44  44  57
regressions  include  the log  of per  capita  income
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Figure 3: Nonbank Intermediary Development Over the 90s
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Figure 3A: Equity Market Development Over Time
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